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tractable trade-off between static and dynamic incentives. In our model, a principal wants
an agent to complete a project. The agent undertakes unobservable effort, which affects in
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1 Introduction
It has been estimated that approximately 90% of American companies use, to some extent
at least, agency firms to find workers; see Fernandez-Mateo (2003). According to Finlay
and Coverdill (2000), between 13% and 20% of firms use private employment agencies
“frequently” to find a wide variety of workers. The proportion is higher when searching
for senior executives. Recent surveys in the pharmaceutical sector estimate almost two-
thirds of senior executive hires involve a ‘headhunter’. Typically, it takes a number of
months to find and recruit a candidate; for example, the same pharmaceutical source
states that the average length of time taken to fill a post is between four and six months
from the start of the search. See Pharmafocus (2007). Payment to headhunters takes two
forms. Contingency headhunters are paid only when they place a candidate successfully (a
typical fee is 20–35% of the candidate’s first year’s salary). Retained headhunters receive
an initial payment, some payment during search, and a bonus payment on success. See
Finlay and Coverdill (2000). There is risk attached to search: between 15% and 20% of
searches in the pharmaceutical sector fail to fill a post; Pharmafocus (2007).
Residential real estate accounts for a large share of wealth—33% in U.S. in 2005,
according to Merlo, Ortalo-Magne´, and Rust (2006), and 26% in the UK in 1999, according
to the Office of National Statistics. The value of residential house sales in England and
Wales between July 2006 and July 2007 was of the order of 10% of the UK’s GDP.1
According to Office of Fair Trading (2004), over nine out of ten people buying and selling a
home in England and Wales use a real estate agent. In the UK, the majority of residential
properties are marketed under sole agency agreement: a single agent is appointed by a
seller to market their property. (The details of the UK market are given in Merlo and
Ortalo-Magne´ (2004) and Merlo, Ortalo-Magne´, and Rust (2006).) The median time in
the UK to find a buyer who eventually buys the property is 137 days. (Once an offer is
accepted, it still takes on average 80–90 days until the transfer is completed.) The real
estate agent can affect buyer arrival rates, through exerting marketing effort. But there
1The UK’s GDP in 2006 was £1.93 trillion, according to the ONS. The UK Land Registry reports
that roughly 105,000 houses were sold each month over the period July 2006—July 2007, at an average
price of around £180,000 each. See Land Registry (2007).
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is also exogenous risk (such as general market conditions) that affect the time to sale.
In most agreements, the real estate agent is paid a proportion of the final sale price on
completion.
In both of these examples, a principal hires an agent to complete a project. The
principal gains no benefit until the project is completed. The agent can affect the prob-
ability of project completion by exerting effort. The task for the principal is to provide
the agent with dynamic incentives to provide effort. The task of this paper is to analyse
the dynamic incentives that arise in these settings and the contracts that are written as
a result.
Continuation values matter for both sides. For the agent, its myopic incentives are to
equate the marginal cost of effort with the marginal return. But if it fails to complete
the project today, it has a further chance tomorrow. This dynamic factor, all other
things equal, tends to reduce the agent’s effort towards project completion. Similarly, the
principal’s myopic incentives trade off the maginal costs of inducing greater agent effort
(through higher payments) with the marginal benefits. But the principal also knows that
the project can be completed tomorrow; all other things equal, this tends to lower the
payment that the principal pays today for project completion. On the other hand, the
principal also realises that the agent faces dynamic incentives; this factor, on its own,
tends to increase the payment to the agent.
Our modelling approach allows us to resolve these different incentives to arrive at
analytical conclusions. We can do this with some degree of generality; for example, we
allow for the principal and agent to have different discount rates. This then allows us
isolate the different channels that are at work in the model. Three features lie behind
our approach. First, we look at pure project completion: the principal cares only about
final success and receives no interim benefit from the agent’s efforts. Secondly, we deal
with the continuous-time limit of the problem. As noted by Sannikov (forthcoming), this
can lead to derivations that are much more tractable than those in discrete time models.
Finally, in our model, the agent’s participation constraint is not binding; consequently,
its continuation value is strictly positive while employed by the principal. (This arises
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because of a limited liability constraint.) The principal uses the level and dynamics of
the agent’s continuation value to generate incentives for effort.
We start by comparing two stationary problems, in which the principal pays the
sequentially rational wage (i.e., has no ability to commit to a contract to pay the agent),
and in which the principal can commit to pay a constant wage to the agent. Given
our set-up, the principal pays only on completion of the project: the agent receives
no interim payments. In the sequentially rational solution, a change in the wage offer
currently offered by the principal has no effect on future wage offers. As a result, there
is no dynamic incentive effect to consider. In contrast, when the principal commits to
a constant wage over time, by paying more today, the principal must also pay more
tomorrow. As a result, the principal then also increases the continuation value of the
agent. This dynamic incentive decreases the agent’s current effort. Consequently, the
sequentially rational wage offer is higher than the wage offered by a principal who commits
to a constant wage.
This result gives an immediate intuition for what the wage profile with full commit-
ment looks like: we show that it must be decreasing over time. This is the only way in
which the principal can resolve in its favour the trade-off between static incentives (which
call for a high current wage) and dynamic incentives (which call for lower future wages).
We establish this result for all discount rates, regardless of whether the principal or the
agent has the higher discount rate. Further, we show that there are two cases. When the
principal is less patient than the agent, the wage, and hence agent’s effort, must converge
to zero—this is the only way in the which the principal can reduce the agent’s contin-
uation value and so induce high effort. On the other hand, when the principal is more
patient than the agent, the wage and agent’s effort converge to strictly positive levels.
In this case, the principal can rely on the agent’s impatience to provide incentives for
current effort.
We can also say something about the principal’s use of deadlines to provide incentives.
We can show that when the principal commits to a constant wage and can employ only
one agent, a deadline is not used. But it is clear that the best outcome for the principal is
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to use a sequence of agents, each for a single period. So suppose that the principal can fire
an agent and then find a replacement with some probability: replacement agents arrive
according to a Poisson process. We show that the principal’s optimal deadline decreases
with the arrival rate of replacement agents.
We conclude the analysis by considering how the main results might change when
project quality matters. (For most of the paper, we assume that the completed project
yields a fixed and verifiable benefit to the principal.) The issue is complicated; but we
provide at least one setting in which our results hold even with this complication.
At first glance, our results look similar to those in papers that look at unemployment
insurance: see e.g., Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). In
these papers, a government must make payments to an unemployed worker to provide a
minimum level of expected discounted utility to the worker. The worker can exert effort to
find a job; the government wants to minimise the total cost of providing unemployment
insurance. Shavell and Weiss (1979) show that the optimal benefit payments to the
unemployed worker should decrease over time. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) establish
that the government can improve things by imposing a tax on the individual when it finds
work.
We find that the principal’s optimal payment under full commitment decreases over
time. The unemployment insurance literature finds decreasing unemployment benefits
over time. Despite this similarity, our results are quite different. Perhaps the easiest way
to see this is to note that both Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997) require that the agent (worker) is risk averse. Without this assumption, neither
paper can establish a decreasing profile of payments. In contrast, we allow for a risk
neutral agent. We ensure that the principal does not simply sell the project to the
agent by imposing limited liability. The limited liability constraint creates a positive
continuation value for the agent. The principal controls this continuation value in order
to give the agent incentives for effort. If instead we have a risk averse agent and no
limited liability, then, in our model, the principal would employ a constant penalty while
the project is not completed, and a constant payment on completion. Hence our work
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identifies the agent’s continuation value, and not its risk aversion, as a key factor driving
decreasing payments.
We also argue that our paper identifies much more clearly the intertemporal incentives
in this type of dynamic moral hazard problem. We show explicitly how continuation values
affect current choices. By allowing for different discount rates betweeen the principal and
the agent, we can close off different channels in the model in order to highlight their
effects. The simplicity of our set-up allows us to consider issues—such as deadlines and
project quality—that are not dealt with in the unemployment insurance papers.
Our work is, of course, related to the broader literature on dynamic moral hazard
problems: particularly the more recent work on continuous-time models. This literature
has demonstrated in considerable generality the benefits to the principal of being able to
condition contracts on the intertemporal performance of the agent. By doing so, the prin-
cipal can relax the agent’s incentive compatibility constraints. See e.g., Malcomson and
Spinnewyn (1988) and Laffont and Martimort (2002). More recently, Sannikov (2007),
Sannikov (forthcoming) and Willams (2006) have analysed principal-agent problems in
continuous time. For example, in Sannikov (forthcoming), an agent controls the drift of
a diffusion process, the realisation of which in each period affects the principal’s payoff.
When the agent’s action is unobserved, Sannikov characterises the optimal contract quite
generally, in terms of the drift and volatility of the agent’s continuation value in the
contract. For example, he shows that the drift of the agent’s value always points in the
direction where it is cheaper to provide the agent with incentives.
An immediate difference between this paper and e.g., Sannikov (forthcoming) is that
we concentrate on project completion. We think this case is of independent interest for
a number of different economic applications. But we also think that our setting, while
less general in some respect than Sannikov’s, serves to make very clear the intertemporal
incentives at work.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model.
Section 3 looks at the sequentially rational solution in which the principal has no com-
mitment ability. Section 4 looks at the situation when the principal commits to a wage
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that is constant over time. The contrast between this and the sequentially rational solu-
tion gives a strong intuition for the properties of the wage that the principal sets when
it has full commitment power (and so can commit to a non-constant wage). The latter
is analysed in section 5. Section 6 looks at the issue of deadlines; section 7 considers the
issues that arise when the agent can affect the quality of the completed project. Our
overall conclusions are stated in section 8.
2 The Model
Consider a continuous-time model where an agent must exert effort in any period in order
to have a positive probability of success in a project. Assume that the effort choices of
the agent are unobservable but the success of the project is verifiable; hence payments
can be contingent only on the event of success or no success.
The principal and the agent are risk neutral; but the agent is credit constrained so
that payments from principal to agent must be non-negative in all periods. (Otherwise
the solution to the contracting problem would be trivial: sell the project to the agent.)
In fact, the agent could be allowed to be risk averse: the key assumption for our analysis
is limited liability.
The instantaneous probability of success when the agent exerts the effort level a within
a time interval of length ∆t is a∆t and the cost of such effort is c(a)∆t. We make the
following assumption about the cost function.
Assumption 1 • c′(a) ≥ 0, c′′(a) ≥ 0, c′′′(a) ≥ 0 for all a ≥ 0.
• c(0) = 0 and lima→∞ c
′(a) =∞.
• c′(a) + ac′′(a) and (ac′(a)− c(a))/a are strictly increasing in a, and equal to zero at
a = 0.
• ac′(a)− c(a)− a2c′′(a) ≤ 0 for all a ≥ 0.
This assumption is satisfied e.g., for quadratic costs: c(a) = γa2, where γ > 0.
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Consider contracts of the form where the principal pays w(t) ≥ 0 to the agent if a
success takes place in time period t and nothing if there is no success. This is the only
form of contract that the principal will use: it is clearly not optimal to make any payment
to the agent before project completion. Success is worth v ≥ 0 to the principal. Both the
principal and the agent discount, with discount rates of rP and rA respectively.
We consider several models of contracting between the principal and the agent. We
solve first for the sequentially rational wage level. We then consider the case where the
principal must choose a stationary wage at the beginning of the game. We show that the
sequentially rational wage exceeds the stationary commitment level. We then show that
under full commitment, any stationary wage profile is dominated by a non-stationary,
non-increasing one. Finally, we consider the use of deadlines for providing incentives.
3 Sequentially rational wage level
We start by supposing that the principal offers a spot wage contract for each period to the
agent (or has the power to offer a temporary bonus for immediate success). We consider
wage proposals of the form
w(s) =
{
w for s ∈ [t, t+∆t),
w˜ for s ≥ t+∆t.
There is no loss of generality in this, since, as we shall see, the sequentially rational
solution involves a constant wage. The crucial feature of this wage proposal is that the
current wage w can be different from the future wage w˜.
The agent’s dynamic optimization problem can be characterized by a Bellman equa-
tion. Let the agent’s value function from time t+∆t onwards be W˜ ; let its value function
at time t be W . Then
W = max
a
{a∆tw − c(a)∆t+ e−rA∆t(1− a∆t)W˜}.
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This Bellman equation can be rewritten:
W − W˜ = max
a
{
(
a(w − W˜ )− c(a)− rAW˜
)
∆t}. (1)
The first-order condition (which is also sufficient by convexity of c) is:
c′(a) = w − W˜.
Denote the solution to this by a(w; w˜). Note that if w > w˜, then a(w; w˜) > a(w;w) >
a(w˜; w˜). The implicit function theorem implies that
∂a(w; w˜)
∂w
=
1
c′′(a(w; w˜))
. (2)
The stationarity of the problem means that the sequentially rational wage will, in fact,
be constant: w = w˜. Hence W = W˜ , so that the agent’s first-order condition can be
written as
w − c′(a(w;w))−
(
a(w;w)c′(a(w;w))− c(a(w;w))
rA
)
= 0. (3)
The principal’s Bellman’s equation is:
V = max
w
{a(w; w˜)∆t(v − w) + e−rP∆t(1− a(w; w˜)∆t)V˜ }.
V˜ is independent of w and hence the first-order condition is
w = v −
a(w;w)(a(w;w) + rP )
rP
1
∂a(w;w˜)
∂w
Substitution gives
w = v −
a(w;w)(a(w;w) + rP )
rP
c′′(a(w;w)) (4)
which along with equation (3) gives the sequentially rational wage wS and the agent’s
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aw
(3)
(4)
aS
wS
Figure 1: The sequentially rational solution with quadratic costs
effort level aS.
Equations (3) and (4) are reaction functions for the dynamic game; their intersection
point determines the sequentially rational equilibrium. The equations give relationships
between wage w and effort a, which can also be interpreted in terms of the demand and
supply of effort. The agent’s supply of effort, given by equation (3), is an upward-sloping
curve in (a, w) space: the agent requires a higher wage in order to put in more effort. The
principal’s (inverse) demand for effort, given by equation (4), is downward-sloping: the
higher the effort put in, the more likely it is that the principal has to pay the wage, and
so the lower the wage that the principal wants to set. Equilibrium is determined by the
unique intersection point of the reaction functions: an effort level aS and wage level wS.
The solution is illustrated in figure 1, which plots equations (3) and (4) for the case
of quadratic costs: c(a) = γa2, where γ > 0. In this example, equation (3) gives
w(a) =
γa2 + 2γrAa
rA
and equation (4) gives
w(a) = v −
2aγ(a + rP )
rP
.
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4 Commitment to a single wage offer
We now contrast the sequentially rational solution to the alternative case in which the
principal commits to a wage w for the duration of the game and the agent maximizes
utility by choosing effort optimally in each period.
The agent’s dynamic optimization problem is characterized by the Bellman equation:
W = max
a
{a∆tw − c(a)∆t+ e−rA∆t(1− a∆t)W}.
Letting ∆→ 0 and rearranging, we obtain
rAW = max
a
{aw − c(a)− aW}.
The agent’s first-order condition (which is also sufficient by convexity of c) is:
c′(a) = w −W.
Substituting W from the first-order condition into Bellman’s equation gives:
W =
ac′(a)− c(a)
rA
; (5)
finally, this gives
w − c′(a)−
(
ac′(a)− c(a)
rA
)
= 0 (6)
which determines the optimal effort level a(w), as a function of w, in this case. The
first-order condition has two components. The first, w − c′(a), relates to the myopic
incentives that the agent faces, equating the wage to its marginal cost of effort. The
second, −(ac′(a) − c(a))/rA, describes the dynamic incentives. Since c(·) is convex, this
term is non-positive. When rA is very large (the agent discounts the future entirely), only
the myopic incentives matter. When rA is very small (no discounting), only dynamic
incentives matter; the agent then exerts very low effort.
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The implicit function theorem implies that
da
dw
≡ a′(w) =
rA
(a+ rA)c′′(a)
> 0. (7)
Notice that the agent’s current effort is less elastic in this case than in the sequentially
rational solution. This is because a change in the constant commitment wage increases
both the current and future wages. An agent faced with a higher future wage has a higher
continuation value, and is therefore less willing to supply effort now.
Consider next the principal’s optimization problem. For a fixed level of a, the value
to the principal is:
V (a, w) =
a(w)(v − w)
a(w) + rP
.
The optimality condition is
V ′(w) =
d
dw
V (a(w), w) =
∂V (a, w)
∂a
da
dw
+
∂V
∂w
= 0.
Hence (simplifying) we have:
w = v −
a(w)(a(w) + rP )
rP
1
a′(w)
. (8)
Equation (8) shows the principal’s balance of myopic and dynamic incentives. When rP
is very large (so that the principal discounts the future entirely), the first-order condition
reduces to the myopic marginal equality:
(v − w)a′(w)− a = 0.
When rP is very small (no discounting), the first-order condition is dominated by dynamic
incentives and the principal sets a zero wage.
Substituting for a′(w) gives
w = v −
a(w)(a(w) + rA))(a(w) + rP )
rArP
c′′(a(w)), (9)
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aw
(6)
(9)
(4)
aC
wC
aS
wS
Figure 2: The constant commitment and sequentially rational solutions with quadratic
costs
which, along with equation (6), can be solved for the equilibrium effort level aC and the
optimal wage wC .
Equations (6) and (9) are the reaction functions for the dynamic game with commit-
ment to a constant wage. As in the sequentially rational solution, the agent’s reaction
function is an upward-sloping curve in (a, w) space; the principal’s reaction is downward-
sloping. Equilibrium is determined by the unique intersection point of the reaction func-
tions: an effort level aC and wage level wC .
The solution is illustrated in figure 2, which plots equations (6) and (9) for the case
of quadratic costs: c(a) = γa2, where γ > 0. In this example, equation (6) gives
w(a) =
γa2 + 2γrAa
rA
and equation (9) gives
w(a) = v −
2aγ(a + rA)(a+ rP )
rArP
.
Comparison of equations (2) and (7) shows that the agent’s current effort is more
elastic in the sequentially rational case, because a marginal change in the current wage
does not (necessarily) raise all future wages as well. In terms of reaction functions, the
agent’s reaction function is the same in the sequentially rational and constant commitment
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cases. The principal’s reaction is higher in the sequentially rational case: the principal
is willing to pay a higher wage, for any given effort level. This is illustrated in figure
2 (for the quadratic cost case), which shows the upward shift in the principal’s reaction
function.
Consequently, the following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 1 In the sequentially rational solution, both the wage and the effort level
are higher than in the constant commitment case: wS ≥ wC and aS ≥ aC .
4.1 Comparative statics of equilibrium
The comparative statics of the equilibrium action and wage can also be investigated. Of
particular interest is how the action and wage depend on the separate discount rates rP
and rA. Two cases are of particular interest:
1. rP = rA = +∞: both the principal and the agent are myopic, ignoring all continu-
ation values and playing the game as if it were one-shot.
2. rP < rA = +∞: the agent is myopic, but the principal is not.
These two cases allow us to identify the dynamic incentives in the model, by shutting
down various channels in turn. The second case, with rA = +∞, also has a useful
interpretation, as a case where the principal operates for an infinite number of periods,
employing a sequence of different agents each for one period. This case will be useful
when analysing wages with deadlines in section 6.
In the myopic case, with rP = rA = +∞, the agent’s and principal’s continuation
values are equal to zero. The agent’s first-order condition is then
w = c′(a). (10)
The principal’s first-order condition is
w = v − ac′′(a). (11)
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aw
(6) (9)
(10)
(11)
aC
wC
aM
wM
Figure 3: The constant commitment and myopic solutions
Equations (10) and (11) define the myopic wage wM and effort aM .
It is straightforward to show that the myopic effort aM is greater than the effort in the
constant commitment case aC . The comparison with the constant commitment wage wC
is more difficult. Figure 3 (using quadratic costs) illustrates why. Equation (10) defines
a curve in (a, w) space that lies below the curve defined by equation (6). That is, in
the dynamic problem, the agent requires a higher wage to exert the same effort level as
in the static situation. Clearly, this is due to the continuation value that is present in
the dynamic problem. Equation (11) defines a curve in (a, w) space that lies above the
curve defined by equation (9): the dynamic principal offers a lower wage than the static
principal, for any given effort level. The reason is the same: the prospect of continuation
value in the dynamic problem leads the principal to lower the wage. Both shifts lead to
a lower effort level in the dynamic problem; but have an ambiguous effect on the wage.
Now consider the case rP < rA = +∞. The agent is myopic, and so its first-order
condition is
c′(a(w)) = w.
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The principal’s first-order condition is
w = v −
a(w)(a(w) + rP )
rP
c′′(a(w)). (12)
Let the effort level in this case be aR,∞ and the wage level wR,∞. (The notation will become
clearer in section 6). As in the previous case, the effect of increasing rA to infinity on the
effort level is easy to establish, but the effect on wage is ambiguous. An increase in the
agent’s discount rate always increases the equilibrium effort level. This occurs because the
agent’s reaction function shifts downwards, while the principal’s reaction function shifts
upwards. The shifts are illustrated in figure 4 for the quadratic cost case. The figure
also summarises the different cases that we have considered. The principal’s reaction
functions are labelled ‘P’, subscripted with the values of the discount rates. The agent’s
reaction functions are labelled ‘A’. The sequentially rational solution is labelled ‘S’; the
constant commitment solution with rP and rA finite is labelled ‘C’; the myopic case (with
rP = rA = ∞) is labelled ‘M’; and the agent replacement case (with rP < rA = ∞) is
labelled ‘R’.
The figure shows that we can make the following general statements.
Proposition 2 • Effort levels: aC ≤ aS ≤ aR,∞ ≤ aM .
• Wage levels: wC ≤ wS; wR,∞ ≤ wS; and wR,∞ ≤ wM .
Only a little more can be said about equilibrium wages in particular cases. For exam-
ple, suppose that costs are quadratic: c(a) = γa2. We can then establish the following.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the cost function is quadratic: c(a) = γa2, with γ > 0. In
this case: (i) wC < wM ; (ii)
Proof. With quadratic costs, aM = v/4γ and wM = v/2. The proof works by determining
the action levels in equations (6) and (9) that result by setting wC = wM = v/2. We
establish that the action level from equation (9) is less than the action level from equation
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ArA<∞ ArA=∞
PrP ,rA<∞
PrP <rA=∞
PrP=rA=∞
bC
b
R
bS
b
M
Figure 4: Summary of the cases
(6). This then necessarily means that wC < wM . From equation (6),
v
2
= 2γa+
γa2
rA
; (13)
from equation (9),
v
2
= 2γa +
2γa2(rA + rP + a)
rArP
. (14)
It is clear, therefore, that the action level in equation (13) is greater than the action level
in equation (14). This concludes the proof of the first part. 
Even with quadratic costs, no clear comparison can be made between e.g., wC and
wR,∞. Numerical solution with particular values for v, rA and rP shows that w
C can be
greater or less than wR,∞, depending on the size of γ, the cost parameter. Outside of
the quadratic cost case, the ordering wage levels in the different cases can be changed by
altering the degree of convexity of the cost function and the discount rates. The effect of
these changes is to alter the extent to which the principal’s and agent’s reaction functions
shift as the comparative statics are done.
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5 Commitment to non-stationary wages
The analysis so far shows that the optimal commitment wage is not stationary in general.
If the optimal commitment wage is stationary, then it must be at the level given in section
4. In section 3, we considered deviations for ∆t units of time from a stationary wage.
Since the analysis shows that it is optimal for the principal to offer a different wage if
continuation wages are at wC, we conclude immediately that the optimal commitment
path of wages cannot be constant.
In order to derive the optimal commitment wage schedule, we use the method de-
veloped by Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Phelan and Townsend (1991) and write the
optimal contract in terms of the agent’s continuation value as the state variable. Consider
an arbitrary reward function w(t). The agent’s Bellman’s equation is given by:
rAW (t) = max
a
{
a(w(t)−W (t))− c(a) + W˙ (t)
}
. (15)
The agent’s first-order condition is
w(t) = W (t) + c′(a(t)). (16)
Substituting into the Bellman equation gives
W˙ (t) = rAW (t)− (a(t)c
′(a(t)− c(a(t))). (17)
Equations (16) and (17) are constraints on the principal’s problem.
The principal’s Bellman equation is
rPV (W ) = max
a
{
a(t)(v − V (W )−W − c′(a(t)))
+ (rAW − (a(t)c
′(a(t))− c(a(t))))V ′(W )
}
(18)
where equation (16) has to been used to substitute in for the wage and equation (17) for
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W˙ . The principal’s first-order condition is
v − V (W )−W − (c′(a(t)) + a(t)c′′(a(t)))− a(t)c′′(a(t))V ′(W ) = 0; (19)
from the properties of the cost function (see assumption 1), this is necessary and sufficient
for an optimum. Differentiating this first-order condition with respect to time gives
− V ′(W )W˙ − W˙ − (2c′′(a(t)) + a(t)c′′′(a(t)))a˙(t)
− (c′′(a(t)) + a(t)c′′′(a(t)))V ′(W )a˙(t)− a(t)c′′(a(t))V ′′(W )W˙ = 0. (20)
The envelope theorem on equation (18) gives
−a(t)(V ′(W ) + 1)− (rP − rA)V
′(W ) + V ′′(W )W˙ = 0. (21)
Combining equations (17), (20) and (21) gives
(
c′′(a(t)) + (V ′(W ) + 1)(c′′(a(t)) + a(t)c′′′(a(t)))
)
a˙(t)
= −(V ′(W ) + 1)
(
rAW − (a(t)c
′(a(t))− c(a(t)))
)
+ a2(t)c′′(a(t))(rP − rA)V
′(W ). (22)
Equations (17) and (22) determine the dynamics of the system.
There are two further optimality conditions. The principal is free to choose the level
of the agent’s value at the start of the program. The initial valueW0 is determined by the
(necessary) condition V ′(W0) = 0. The second optimality condition is the transversality
condition that the system converges to a steady state in which a˙ = W˙ = 0 and a and W
are bounded.
We are now able to characterise the dynamics of the optimal commitment contract.
Proposition 4 In the full commitment solution, the agent’s continuation value W (t),
the optimal wage profile w(t), and the agent’s effort level a(t) are all decreasing over
time. If rP ≥ rA, then the continuation value, wage and effort levels converge to zero:
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limt→∞W (t) = limt→∞w(t) = limt→∞ a(t) = 0. If rP < rA, then the wage and effort
levels converge to strictly positive levels. The initial effort level, and hence all levels, are
below the myopic effort: a(t) ≤ aM .
Proof. The proof uses a phase diagram in (a,W ) space. Three aspects need to be
analysed: the dynamics of a and W ; and the sign of V ′(·) in equilibrium.
The sign of W˙ is, from equation (17), determined by the sign of rAW − (ac
′(a)−c(a)).
This defines an upward-sloping function in (a,W ) space, given by
WW˙=0(a) ≡
ac′(a)− c(a)
rA
so that for W > (<)WW˙=0(a), W˙ > (<)0. Note that WW˙=0 = 0.
To determine the sign of V ′(·) in equilibrium, manipulate the principal’s Bellman
equation and first-order condition to give
(rAW − ac
′(a) + c(a) + (a + rP )ac
′′(a))V ′(W ) = rP (v −W − c
′(a))− (a+ rP )ac
′′(a).
Consider the left-hand side of this equation. From assumption 1, rAW − ac
′(a) + c(a) +
(a + rP )ac
′′(a) ≥ 0 for all non-negative values of a and W . Hence the sign of V ′(W ) is
determined by the sign of rP (v −W − c
′(a))− (a+ rP )ac
′′(a). This defines a function in
(a,W ) space, given by
WV ′=0(a) ≡ v − c
′(a)−
(
a + rP
rP
)
ac′′(a).
This is a downward-sloping function, with an interceptWV ′=0(0) = v; it hits the horizontal
axis at an effort level aˆ strictly less than the myopic level aM (defined by v − c′(aM) −
aMc′′(aM) = 0). For values of (a,W ) lying below (above) this function, V ′(W ) is positive
(negative); along the function, V ′(W ) = 0. The function WW˙=0(a) is, therefore, split into
two portions by the function WV ′=0(a); call the intersection point of the two functions
(a∗,W ∗).
Now consider the dynamics of a, determined by equation (22). When V ′(·) = 0 (in
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particular, at the optimal initial choice of W ), the term on the left-hand side, c′′(a(t)) +
(V ′(W )+1)(c′′(a(t))+a(t)c′′′(a(t))), is non-negative (using assumption 1). The right-hand
side is equal to
−
(
rAW − (a(t)c
′(a(t))− c(a(t))) + a2c′′(a)
)
,
which by assumption 1 is negative for all non-negative values of a and W . Hence a˙ ≤ 0
at the optimal initial choice of W .
The function defined by a˙ = 0 is
Wa˙=0(a) ≡
ac′(a)− c(a)
rA
−
ac′′(a)
rA
(
a+ (rP − rA)
V ′(W )
V ′(W ) + 1
)
.
Note that when V ′ = 0,
Wa˙=0(a) ≡
ac′(a)− c(a)− a2c′′(a)
rA
≤ 0
from assumption 1. Hence the function Wa˙=0(a) crosses the function WV ′=0(a) at a point
below the horizontal axis. If rP ≥ rA, then Wa˙=0(a) ≤ 0 for all a ∈ [0, aˆ]. If rP < rA,
then Wa˙=0(a) > WW˙=0(a) for sufficiently small a. Since Wa˙=0(a) is continuous in a, the
Wa˙=0(a) curve must therefore cross the WW˙=0(a) at a value of a that is strictly less than
a∗.
We can now determine the dynamics of a and W . The region of particular interest
for the analysis is defined as follows. Let
W(a) ≡ {W ∈ R+|W ≤WW˙=0(a) and W ≤WV ′=0(a) and W ≥Wa˙=0(a)}
for a ∈ [0, aˆ]. Let
E ≡ [0, aˆ]W(a).
For (a,W ) ∈ E , both a˙ and W˙ are non-positive. The region E is illustrated as the shaded
regions in figures 5 and 6. If rP ≥ rA, then E is defined as the (lower) area between
the curves WW˙=0(a) and WV ′=0(a). If rP < rA, then E is further defined by the curve
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Wa˙=0(a).
An initial choice ofW on the portion of theWV ′=0(a) curve above theWW˙=0(a) cannot
be optimal. The reason is that the dynamics from this point involve W˙ ≥ 0. Hence any
path from such a point cannot converge to a steady state, and by transversality cannot
be optimal.
Hence the optimal initial choice of W must lie on the portion of the WV ′=0(a) curve
below the WW˙=0(a). (Note that this must involve an initial effort level less than aˆ, and
hence less than the myopic level aM .) The initial dynamics from such a point are W˙ ≤ 0
and a˙ ≤ 0. The resulting path lies in the region E , and hence W˙ ≤ 0 and a˙ ≤ 0 along all
parts of an optimal path. The dynamics of w(t) then follows from (16).
If rP ≥ rA, then assumption 1 ensures that the function Wa˙=0(a) is negative for all
values of a ∈ [0, aˆ]. Hence the only feasible steady state is a = W = 0. If rP < rA, then
there is a second steady state with strictly positive a ∈ (0, a∗) and W ∈ (0,W ∗); the
optimal path converges to this steady state. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the proof of the proposition. In the shaded area in the
figures, a˙ and W˙ are non-positive. The optimal initial point must lie on the portion of
theWV ′=0(a) curve that is in bold. Any optimal path from that portion of the curve must
move into the shaded area; hence a˙ and W˙ must be non-positive along the entire path.
Possible steady states are marked with a dot; clearly, they must lie on the curve along
which W˙ = 0. If rP ≥ rA, then only one steady state exists: the origin, with a = W = 0.
Otherwise, two steady states exist (as shown in the figure). The optimal path converges
to the steady state with a =W = 0, if rP ≥ rA. Otherwise, it converges to a steady state
with strictly positive levels of a and W . The latter is consistent with the previous result
that in the limit, as rA →∞, the equilibrium effort level converges to the (positive) level
aR,∞.
These results are intuitive. Limited liability means that the agent earns positive rents
from the contract. The principal uses the dynamics of these rents to provide the agent
with incentives. In particular, the full commitment contract ensures that the agent’s
continuation value is decreasing in equilibrium. By ensuring this, the principal gives the
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aW
WV ′=0(a) WW˙=0(a)
Wa˙=0(a)
W ∗
a∗
b
aˆ aM
Figure 5: Phase diagram for the problem with full commitment with rP ≥ rA
a
W
WV ′=0(a) WW˙=0(a)
Wa˙=0(a)
W ∗
a∗
b
b
aˆ aM
Figure 6: Phase diagram for the problem with full commitment with rP < rA
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agent incentives to exert effort today. The continuation value is driven downwards by a
decreasing wage; but the agent’s effort also decreases over time. When the agent is more
patient that the principal, the principal has to drive the agent’s wage (and hence effort)
down to zero in the long-run in order to generate incentives for effort. But then the agent
is less patient, the principal can rely on the agent’s impatience to generate incentives. In
this case, the long-run wage and effort are both strictly positive. In all cases, the principal
induces less effort from forward-looking agent: equilibrium effort is less than the myopic
level.
6 Wages with a deadline
Consider now the case where the principal can commit to a constant wage w until time
T . In general, this wage policy is not optimal, although it captures in a stark way a
key aspect of the full commitment policy: a declining wage. In this section, we analyse
whether such a policy can ever be optimal.
The agent’s Bellman’s equation is as before:
rAW = max
a
{
a(w −W )− c(a) + W˙
}
;
but note now that the wage w is not a function of time. The agent’s first-order condition
is also unchanged:
w = W + c′(a(t)).
Differentiating this first-order condition with respect to time gives
c′′(a)a˙ = −W˙. (23)
The agent’s continuation value at T must be zero: W (T ) = 0. Since the agent’s value
is non-negative, it must be that W˙ ≤ 0. Hence equation (23) implies that a˙ ≥ 0: the
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agent’s effort increases over time when the principal sets a constant wage and a deadline.
The effort level at the terminal time must equal the myopic level, for the given wage. We
use this fact in the proof of the following proposition (which, since it is lengthy, is given
in the appendix).
Proposition 5 If rP = rA, then when committing to pay a constant wage to a single
agent, the principal does not use a finite deadline.
Proposition 5 shows that the principal will not use a deadline—with a constant wage
and equal discount rates for the principal and the agent, at least. On the other hand, the
optimal situation for the principal is to employ an infinite sequence of agents each for a
single period—the benchmark analysed in section 2. To span these two cases, suppose
that the principal can search for a replacement agent, but only after it has fired its
current agent. Search takes time: a replacement agent is found according to a Poisson
process with parameter λ. The model considered in proposition 5 sets λ = 0: there is no
prospect of replacement. The model in section 2 has λ = +∞: replacement can occur
infinitely often. (This explains the notation in that section, where wR,∞ is the wage when
replacement occurs infinitely often.)
The principal’s optimisation problem is
V (λ) ≡ max
w,T
{∫ T
0
exp{−rP t− Aw,T (t)}aw,T (t)(v − w)dt+ exp{−rPT}
λ
rP + λ
V (λ)
}
.
(24)
Equation (24) makes explicit the dependence of the principal’s value on the arrival rate λ
of replacement agents. We are interested in characterising the dependence of the optimal
choice of T (λ) on the arrival rate λ.
Proposition 6 T (λ) is non-increasing in λ.
The proof of the proposition is fairly mechanical and is given in the appendix. The
proposition shows the (expected) result that the principal uses a shorter deadline when
it is easier to replace the agent. In the limit, of course, when agents can be replaced
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infinitely often (λ → ∞), the principal is in the ideal position of using a sequence of
agents, each for an interval dt→ 0.
7 Project quality
In the analysis so far, the benefit to the principal from a completed project is fixed and
verifiable. More generally, we might suppose that the agent is able to affect the quality,
and hence the benefit to the principal, of the completed project.
We shall not attempt a general analysis of this issue here. Instead, we outline a variant
of our model where project quality has no effect the overall conclusions. Suppose that an
agent can affect the probability of project completion by exerting effort, in the same way
as in previous sections. But now, the quality of a completed project is drawn at random
from a distribution F (v) where v ≥ 0, which is common knowledge.
At this point, there are two possibilities, which (it will turn out) are equivalent. The
first is that the realised project quality cannot be verified. (For example, the agent may
be a headhunter and the completed project a candidate for an executive position in the
principal’s firm. The fit of the candidate for the principal’s post may be very difficult to
establish to a third-party.) Hence the principal cannot condition payment on the realised
project quality.
The second possibility is that the project quality is verifiable. This then raises the
possibility that the principal pays only when the realised project quality is at least as
great as the current completion wage. But it is easy to see that this cannot be optimal.
The agent’s expected payment on completing at time t would be E[w|v ≥ w] where the
expectation is taken with respect to the quality distribution F (·). The principal gains
E[v − w|v ≥ w]. But the principal could offer this level of payment unconditionally (and
hence present the agent with the same effort incentives); and then accept all completed
projects. The principal would gain E[v|v ≤ w] from this.
So, the principal will continue to pay only on project completion. The problem is un-
altered by this modification: the principal’s benefit v is replaced by an expected benefit—
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that is all. Hence our previous analysis continues to hold.
The crucial feature of this example is that the agent’s effort affects only the arrival
rate of project completion, but not the realised quality. If project quality is affected
(stochastically) by effort levels, then the principal will adjust the wage in order to affect
both the quality and rate of completion of the project. We leave this and other related
issues to further work.
8 Conclusions
We have developed a model of dynamic moral hazard involving project completion which
has allowed us to identify clearly the intertemporal incentives involved. The contrast
between the sequentially rational solution and the contract with commitment to a con-
stant wage points immediately to the form of the full commitment contract. It involves
a completion payment that decreases over time. In this way, the principal decreases the
agent’s continuation value over time; and in this way, gives the agent incentives for effort.
The framework that we have developed is very tractable and offers a base from which we
intend to explore further dynamic incentives for this type of problem.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof has three steps.
1. For any given wage, the expected discounted costs of the agent’s efforts are higher
when the agent is employed in perpetuity than when a finite deadline is used. Let
aw be the agent’s effort with no deadline (since the wage is constant, the effort is
constant). aw,T (t) is the agent’s effort with a deadline T ; because of the deadline,
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this effort varies with time. Then we shall show that
Cw,∞ ≡
∫
∞
0
exp{−rAt− awt}c(aw)dt =
c(aw)
rA + aw
≥ Cw,T ≡
∫ T
0
exp{−rAt− Aw,T (t)}c(aw,T (t))dt
for finite T , where
Aw,T (t) ≡
∫ t
0
aw,T (s)ds.
The proof of this step is by contradiction: suppose not. The expected discounted
cost Cw,T is continuous in T and limT→∞Cw,T = Cw,∞. Hence if Cw,∞ is not larger
than Cw,T for all finite T , then there must be some T
∗ < ∞ such that Cw,T is
maximised at T = T ∗. By continuity, for some cost level C ≡ Cw,T ∗ − ∆, for a
small, positive ∆, there exist two times T1 < T
∗ < T2 such that Cw,T1 = Cw,T2 = C.
At T = T1, Cw,T must be increasing in T . In the limit, as ∆ → 0, this means
that rCw,T1 > c(aw,T1(0)). At T = T2, Cw,T must be decreasing in T . In the
limit, as ∆ → 0, this means that rCw,T2 < c(aw,T2(0)). Since, by construction,
Cw,T1 = Cw,T2, this means that c(aw,T2(0)) > c(aw,T1(0)), or aw,T2(0) > aw,T1(0). But
we have established that aw,T (T ) = a
M for any T . Equation (23) then implies that
if T2 > T1, then aw,T2(0) < aw,T1(0). Hence Cw,∞ ≥ Cw,T for any finite T .
2. For any given wage, the agent’s expected discounted payoff when it is employed in
perpetuity is higher than when a finite deadline is used:
Rw,∞ ≡
∫
∞
0
exp{−rAt− awt}awwdt =
aww
rA + aw
≥ Rw,T ≡
∫ T
0
exp{−rAt−Aw,T (t)}aw,T (t)wdt.
This must hold because Rw,∞ − Cw,∞ ≥ Rw,T − Cw,T and Cw,∞ ≥ Cw,T . The first
statement holds because, when faced with an infinite deadline, the agent can always
choose its effort as if it were facing a finite deadline.
3. The principal’s expected discounted payoff when it employs the agent in perpetuity
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is higher than when a finite deadline is used. To see this, note first that the princi-
pal’s expected discounted payoff is equal to the agent’s expected discounted payoff,
multiplied by a constant factor:
∫
∞
0
exp{−rP t− awt}aw(v − w)dt =
aw(v − w)
rP + aw
=
v − w
w
Rw,∞,∫ T
0
exp{−rP t−Aw,T (t)}aw,T (t)(v − w)dt =
v − w
w
Rw,T .
In these equalities, we use the condition that rA = rP . Secondly, step 2 established
Rw,∞ ≥ Rw,T .
Proof of Proposition 6
Write the principal’s optimisation problem as
max
w,T
{
α(w, T )(v − w) + exp{−rPT}g(λ)
}
,
where
α(w, T ) ≡
∫ T
0
exp{−rP t−Aw,T (t)}aw,T (t)dt,
g(λ) ≡
λ
rP + λ
V (λ).
Since V (λ) must be non-decreasing in λ, g(λ) is non-decreasing in λ. The first-order
conditions for interior solutions are
αw(v − w)− α = 0, (25)
αT (v − w)− rP exp{−rPT}g(λ) = 0 (26)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and the arguments of α have been omitted for
brevity. (Note the proposition 5 established that αT > 0; it is straightforward to establish
that αw > 0 also.)
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The comparative statics of the optimal controls can be established using Cramer’s
rule. The determinant of the Hessian is
H ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ αww(v − w)− 2αw αwT (v − w)− αTαwT (v − w)− αT αTT (v − w) + r2 exp{−rPT}g(λ)
∣∣∣∣∣.
From the second-order condition for interior solutions, H ≥ 0. By Cramer’s rule,
dT (λ)
dλ
=
1
H
∣∣∣∣∣ αww(v − w)− 2αw 0αwT (v − w)− αT rP exp{−rPT}g′(λ)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
H
(αww(v − w)− 2αw)rP exp{−rPT}g
′(λ) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from the second-order conditions and g′(λ) ≥ 0.
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